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ABSTRACT 
 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes 
the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the 
language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a 
‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how the language 
of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how 
the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is classic Searle—superb and probably 
at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full understanding of the 
fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of the two systems 
of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his previous work, 
Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp 
that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly 
everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based 
on the two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed 
analysis of the book. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
As with Wittgenstein (hereafter W), everything that Searle (hereafter S) writes is a 
treasure and it is wonderful that he remains sharp as he nears 80. Unlike most, even 
his early work is still relevant and he is working on several other books. I also 
suggest his 100 or so lectures and interviews on youtube, vimeo etc., which, though 
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inevitably a bit repetitious, contain many statements not in his writings. I have read 
almost all of his work, and listened to all the lectures, most of them 2 or 3 times. 
These are of special interest as (like Wittgenstein) he does not read from notes, and 
so each is unique and not a replica of a paper, and he is a superb extemporaneous 
speaker who mostly uses unpretentious language (both so different from most 
others). The recent lectures given at European Universities are superb, but don’t 
miss the old ones such as the BBC lecture “A Changing Reality-the science of human 
behavior”, which gives an excellent account of why the lawful repetitious causality 
of the brain’s fast automatic, nonlinguistic system 1 (S1) is fundamentally different 
and not describable in the same way as the limitless complexity of reasons 
characterizing the slow deliberative, linguistic conscious system 2 (S2), which 
generates a combinatorial explosion not usually representable in a useful way by 
scientific laws. The dual system (S1, S2) method of describing thought used in this 
review, common to reasoning research for some 20 years now, is my own and not 
Searle’s. Since I have recently written a 75p article analyzing Searle’s work in 
comparison with that of Wittgenstein (The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle) I will not repeat it and will concentrate on this book only. 
 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –that all 
truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or data 
gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular 
context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in 
the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS, a 
term not used by W and popularized principally by S) are clear. The basic problem 
is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary 
utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. Thus, W in his last 
masterpiece ‘On Certainty’ (OC) looks at perspicuous examples of the varying uses 
of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and ‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of 
narrator, interlocutor and commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use 
(clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses of 
related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical 
insights. There are no ‘problems’ of ‘perception’, ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, 
’time’ etc., but only the need to keep the use (COS) of these words clear. It is useful 
to keep in mind two comments by W that summarize scientism. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
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beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
More than most, S avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses which I have 
pointed out in my many reviews of his work and in spite of his being perhaps the 
best all-around philosopher since W, he does not fully grasp that it is all about 
language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. 
 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes 
the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the 
language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a 
‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’, which can only be about how the language of 
perception works, as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the 
brain works, are exactly the issues. The subtitle (A theory of Perception) is likewise 
contentious (for Wittgensteinians at least) since W warned repeatedly against 
theorizing and even insisted it was impossible to produce theories about behavior, 
as everyone would agree with them—i.e., they would be truisms about our use of 
language. Anything that looks like a theory of higher order thought (mind, 
behavior) is really just a description of what we do, unless of course they are making 
the near universal mistake of giving a scientific theory of how the brain or the world 
works-a different kind of ‘philosophy’ entirely—i.e. ‘Scientism’. Searle is well aware 
of this and has commented on it many times, insisting W is wrong about theories, 
but I don’t think so. Only science has theories, i.e., propositions that can be shown 
true or false and often new evidence leads us to change or even abandon them, 
while philosophy proper (the elucidation in a given context of a language game 
describing our higher order behavior) will be obviously correct and not subject to 
revision as we all recognize it as true—i.e. as a correct use of language. But if S wants 
to call his generalizations about language use ‘theories’ that’s fine, just so long as 
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we are not led astray. I have dealt with these issues at length in my other writings 
and in particular my review of Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’. 
 
It is very useful to read the little volume ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ where 
Searle, Dennett, and Bennett and Hacker have at one another over which language 
games should be played. Bennett and Hacker have given the most detailed 
exposition of these games in ‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’(2003) 
which is continued in Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. 
 
W insisted that there are no new discoveries to be made in philosophy, nor 
explanations to be given, but only clear descriptions of behavior (language) in a 
particular context. Once one understands that all the problems are confusions about 
how language works, we are at peace and philosophy in W’s sense has achieved its 
purpose. As W and S have noted, there is only one reality, so there are not multiple 
versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully be given, and we can 
only communicate in our one public language. There cannot be a private language 
and any ‘private inner thoughts’ cannot have any role in our social life. It should 
also be very straightforward to solve philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if 
it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933).  In our 
modern idiom, perception is the automatic, causally self-reflexive (Searle), rapid, 
true-only mental states or presentations (Searle) of System 1 (S1), while most of 
what we ‘mean’ by the ‘mind’ are the deliberate, slow, reasoned dispositions with 
public true or false representations (conditions of satisfaction-COS) of System 2 (S2). 
 
Searle waits until p45 to present the most recent version of a table he has used 
before. I have been expanding it for some years and as I find it critical to 
understanding behavior, I begin by presenting its most recent version here. In 
accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations of 
S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense the ‘phenomena’ of 
S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other writings Searle says they do, but 
as noted in my other reviews, I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 (“private” 
presentations) and COS2 (public representations). Likewise, I have changed his 
‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his ‘Direction of Causation’ to 
‘Causes Changes In’. 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
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the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted this 
terminology in the table.  
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic 
in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from 
the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, 
Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an 
heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of 
studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of 
language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical 
term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent 
writings. 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may 
consult my articles and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and others on 
academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org and abbreviated versions 
on Amazon. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table 
by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books 
on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision 
research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
(Involuntary –automated-Rules R1) Thinking(Cognition) (No gaps) 
 (Voluntary-deliberative- Rules R2) Willing (Volition)(3 gaps) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
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the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
  
 7 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, 
truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get 
us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical 
problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and 
hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow 
deliberative actions that are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or 
false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-
the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same 
words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the 
percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public 
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) 
cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, 
there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences and in the brain states), 
and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws, 
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which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings 
against theories. This is a special case of the irreducibility of higher level 
descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by Searle, 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in higher 
cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and 
time of events (the past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, 
conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and 
COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all 
S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear 
and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible 
public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-person statements about 
myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about 
others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that this is an 
incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering 
 11 
 
etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as opposed 
to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness 
and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the 
evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major 
advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent (state 
public COS for) events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and 
volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain 
processes of System One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- 
Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event 
occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note 
that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out 
in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in 
the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of 
the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) 
(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive linguistics 
or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the single most 
important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of 
behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
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Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the 
mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) --
the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
(represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The Phenomenological 
Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which 
try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—
cf. Searle e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, 
knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts such as 
language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature 
Memories, Remembering : (X was true) 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions: (X might become True) 
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CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS: Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , 
Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping( a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of them as 
strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, 
Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, 
Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, 
Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 
reflexes in explanations of behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank 
Slate or the Standard Social Science Model--SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of 
objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed 
by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with 
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perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader 
sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the 
operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in 
evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions and 
actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are 
in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives 
an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly 
questionable due to severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and 
hence nothing. This occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting 
in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics of 
this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein 
from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with 
refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The 
general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of 
the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf. Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language 
games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and 
deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy 
edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using 
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the dispositional verb “thinking“)—non-rational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any 
test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information 
until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, writing or other muscular 
contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a 
public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do 
thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. 
Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans to 
substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross 
contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called 
UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in 
S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the 
innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought 
which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles—i.e., 
Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow 
deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of 
frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action into automatic fast 
functions). We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, 
emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more 
about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain 
works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in 
full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, 
biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to 
our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be 
described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so 
famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. 
Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to 
facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and 
reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. This has been 
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explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have 
multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different 
roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense 
first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally describe my 
ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem 
(in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on 
knowledge or information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). 
In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of 
saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs 
used in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate 
themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or 
future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ 
contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe public 
acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no 
information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” 
or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle 
to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 
since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of 
S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many 
Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, 
NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, 
algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Thus when Searle introduces some terminology on p6 of STATA we see that VisExp 
(it is raining) is S1 while Bel(it is raining) or Assert(it is raining) is S2. 
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We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock 
or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which S calls the 
logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the language describing 
HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on philosophical aspects of 
human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into the W/S framework gives some 
clear descriptions which illuminate the use of language. If not, then showing how 
they have been bewitched by language dispels the confusion. As Horwich has noted 
on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my review): 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth 
should be found satisfying enough.” Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as 
W suggested we ought to say “describing”) and S states that the logical structure of 
rationality constitutes various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided one 
realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of 
how language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated via 
examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any 
other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the examples or 
consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context 
sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly 
unlike physics where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the need for 
further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and the causal 
framework) leads us astray in describing HOT. “Philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer 
questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics 
and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many 
others, S has largely avoided and often demolished scientism, but there is a residue 
which evinces itself when he remarks in various writings that we can understand 
consciousness by studying the brain or that he is prepared to give up causality, will 
or mind. W made it abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic 
language games and giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent 
concept. As noted in my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from 
the major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to 
England to study). 
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“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not anything 
that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I believe, 
with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon 
it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian 
subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and 
there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute 
that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s above remark 
on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading expert on W) who 
gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ...What 
needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms 
of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their 
presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
Before remarking further on ‘STATA’ I will first offer some essential comments on 
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philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will 
help to see my reviews of S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the 
Social World (MSW) and W’s BBB (Blue and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical 
Investigations), OC (On Certainty), and other books by and about these geniuses, 
who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology 
books, that I will refer to as the W/S framework. 
 
As noted in my other reviews, philosophical mistakes are of interest since they are 
the universal defaults of our psychology, due the fact that our language lacks 
perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue and Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior (HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, pre-linguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -
-Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can 
be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, 
S, Hacker etc.). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other 
disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" 
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and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will be more and less 
useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, 
since it cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network of 
"cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", 
"cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships 
so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well abstracts the basic structure of 
behavior as described in my other reviews. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is 
representational) and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of 
Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would translate the paragraphs from S’s 
MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" 
as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified 
by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with how we think 
they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted 
and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow 
thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) 
rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as 
they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 
and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned 
deontic cultural relations, so that our normal experience is that we consciously 
control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate 
our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
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of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One 
refers to the true-only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Reflexive(CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s BBB), 
and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing etc.) which 
can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., 
they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in 
BBB). 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about 
behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk 
about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we 
shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it 
means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). — And 
now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, 
we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. 
And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we 
don’t want to deny them.   W’s PI p308 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
 22 
 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 
32 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As 
I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W 
is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional 
and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since what S and various authors here 
call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there 
has to be a sense in which S1 is able to become propositional and they and Searle 
note that the unconscious activities of S2 must be able to become the conscious ones 
of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, 
axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in 
the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It 
would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided 
without consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book 
On Certainly, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--no 
evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action 
(DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as 
follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in 
space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result 
sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his 
description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution of the paradox 
is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the 
conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." 
Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are 
very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and 
the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a 
change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant 
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ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of 
S2 which generates endless cultural extensions, and which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing 
actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by Searle `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and 
by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) 
"It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle. 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote 
from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there 
whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." 
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the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at 
all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it 
were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his 
examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary 
perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is 
entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic 
value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the 
light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front 
of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of 
introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock (DMS) 
but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the 
result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and 
even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts (i.e., philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature etc.) and with rare exceptions there 
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is barely a mention. 
It should be obvious from the above that the issues are always about mistakes in 
language used to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no useful 
sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. 
Such views can exist of philosophy in the other sense but that is not what 
philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and substantive 
philosophy) is about. As often occurs, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to carry 
his understanding of W’s “background” to its logical conclusion and so he suggests 
(as he has frequently) that he might have to give up the concept of free will, which 
I find (with W) incoherent. Not that we ought not to give it up but there is no sense 
that can be made of such a suggestion anymore that one can give up running, 
desiring, intending, hoping etc. Likewise, nobody can give arguments for the 
background (i.e., our axiomatic psychology), as our being able to talk or to live at 
all presupposes it (as W noted frequently). Yes, it’s also true that “reduction” along 
with “monism”, “reality”, etc., are complex language games and they do not carry 
meaning along in little backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear 
and then see how another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass 
are hands down the best lesson on how this has to be done. 
 
One needs to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a COS 
are thereby true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are true only). 
And the “radical underdetermination of meaning” aka “the combinatorial 
explosion” was first solved by W who noted that S1 can be true only. 
 
In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our 
linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists 
independently of our representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows a 
world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
Now that we have a framework, we can consider Searle’s comments on the nature 
of perception. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for on 
page 4 we have the terms 
‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used is some normal sense but we are 
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doing philosophy so we are going to be undulating back and forth between 
language games have no chance of keeping our day to day games distinct from the 
various philosophical ones. Again, you can read some of Neuroscience and 
Philosophy’ or 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Also, a quick 
review of the table of Intentionality above will place his terms, ‘causally self-
reflexive’ etc. in context. Sadly, like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has not 
adopted the two systems framework, so it’s much harder to keep things straight. 
 
So on p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, 
deliberative, slow, with no precise time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their 
public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is 
propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only 
intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is 
system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s COS1) 
and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 500msec ), non-
testable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic and not linguistic i.e., 
not propositional and presentational and only describable in terms of causes of a 
mental state. In spite of this on p7 after crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) 
term ‘propositional attitude’, he says that perception has propositional content, but 
I agree with W that S1 is true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything 
like the sense of S2 where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or 
false. 
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), and 
then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description which 
W noted as showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the end of the 
paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) so for “The 
subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an intentional content 
and the specification of the intentional content is the same as the description of the 
state of affairs that the intentional content presents you with etc.” I would say 
‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can only be described in the public 
language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting again the equivalence of a 
description of believing with that of a description of our perception, he is repeating 
what W noted long ago and which is due to the fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and that 
describing, believing, knowing, expecting, etc. are all different psychological or 
intentional modes or language games played with the same words. 
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On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private’ S1 ‘experiences’ can only 
be their public manifestations—i.e., language we all use to describe public acts as 
even for myself I cannot have any way to attach language to something internal. 
This is of course W’s argument against the possibility of a private language. He also 
mentions several times that hallucinations of X are the same as seeing X but what 
can be the test for this except that we are inclined to use the same words? In this 
case, they are the same by definition so this argument rings hollow. 
 
On p33 his ‘basic forms’ of intentionality are S1 while the ‘derivative forms’ are S2 
and the two modes ‘seeing’ and ‘thinking’ as used here are S1 and S2 but the 
universal problem is that these words can be used for either S1 or S2 and nobody 
keeps them distinct. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which is not 
an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, i.e., to the 
fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front of me, the 
content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the man himself. If I am 
having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual experience has a content, but 
no object. The content can be exactly the same in the two cases, but the presence of 
a content does not imply the presence of an object.” The way I see this is that the 
‘object’ is normally in the world and creates the mental state (S1) and if we put this 
in words it becomes S2 with COS2 (i.e., a public truthmaker) and this does entail 
the public object, but for an hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the 
‘object’ is only the similar mental state resulting from brain activation. 
 
On p37 as usual in describing human behavior it seems to me very useful to try to 
keep S1 and S2 separated so here we can refer to the perception of something as P1 
but when we describe it we can refer to the perception as P2. 
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not just about understanding perception but 
not understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are exactly the 
same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a particular context 
so as to yield clear COS. 
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On p53 what exactly is the test (COS2) that shows that the cause of or mental state 
of an hallucination is the ‘same’ as that when there is no hallucination? Even if we 
‘see’ our long dead mother, with a few possible rare exceptions of insanity, brain 
damage etc., we know it’s not her—i.e., it’s false and we take the failure to 
distinguish the two as a sign of illness. So, the COS2 in hallucination is only that we 
feel as if she were present, though we (normally) know it cannot be, while the COS2 
when she was alive is that we can confirm by a public test it is her. But he is correct 
that there is a more or less common percept in the two cases so that the presentation 
or COS1 is similar and conceivably could sometimes be as identical as any two 
mental states, thoughts, feelings etc. ever get—i.e., not very. 
 
On p59 I believe that the argument from transparency originated with W. "The limit 
of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds 
to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." 
(Wittgenstein CV p10). At the bottom of the page, once again the presentation is S1 
and the description or representation is S2. 
 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we fail 
to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in S1 or we 
must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., no COS2. 
 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of S1 and 
not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto the next 
page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of philosophy, and it is 
so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral sciences, cannot get into 
the 21st century and use the two systems terminology which renders so many 
opaque issues very clear. Likewise, with the failure to grasp that it’s always just a 
matter of whether it’s a scientific issue or a philosophical one and if philosophical 
then which language game is going to be played and what the COS are in the 
context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W made 
so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the whole 
neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only be a public 
phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test for my having an 
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experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity here which will lead to 
others. Many 
think these don’t matter, many think they do. Something happens in the brain but 
that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue and certainly by ‘experience’ or by ‘I saw 
a rabbit’ one never means the neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a matter for 
investigation but one of using words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more philosophical 
jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted the two systems 
framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). Likewise, for the 
following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of affairs’, ‘visual experiences’, 
‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we have to decide what the 
COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties of S1 and S2 all of this 
becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could stop ‘struggling to express’ 
it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means that perceptions are S1 and so 
mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, untestable (true-only) etc. while 
beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not mental states, do not have a definite 
time, have reasons and not causes, are testable with COS etc. On p70 he notes that 
intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are part of the reflexive acts of 
S1 (A1 in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts which have become reflexive 
(S2A in my terminology). 
 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate dividing 
line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes the percept to 
higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and expressed in 
language. 
 
Regarding p100, see W’s ‘On Certainty’ and DMS’s papers and books on it or just 
my brief analysis of their efforts in my LSR paper. On p101 we can usually substitute 
COS for ‘truth conditions’. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 and 
‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in the same 
sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science (e.g., physics) 
would be different if people had realized they were playing language games and 
not doing science. 
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On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no language 
as it’s automatic and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to describe what I saw 
I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out long ago as showing the 
limits of language. 
 
On p108 we can say that deliberate acts (A2) always must happen by activating S1 
just as must reflexive acts (A1). On p109 we might rephrase ‘…whenever you 
consciously perceive anything, you take the cause of your perceptual experience to 
be its object’ as ‘perceptions, like all functions of S1 are nontestable’. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak so that 
“Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of representation, and 
because all representation is under aspects, the visual presentations will always 
present their conditions of satisfaction under some aspects and not others.” 
becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data to S2, which has public COS, 
we can speak of S1 as though it also has public COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers 
to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events which make the statement true or false and 
‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ refer to S1 and S2. On p112 the basic action and 
basic perception are isomorphic because S1 feeds its data to S2, which can only 
generate actions by feeding back to S1 to contract muscles, and lower level 
perception and higher level perception can only be described in the same terms due 
to there being only one language to describe S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be 
much less mysterious if he would adopt the two systems framework so that instead 
of “internal connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception 
would just be noted as the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p118 if W did commit the Bad Argument it was in the TLP and not his later 
work, and in any case the ‘fact’ is the COS (the representation) or the truthmaker of 
S2 stated by a sentence which is just the right description. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because the 
language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological 
phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly speak 
of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this manifests is ‘meaning is 
not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games. 
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On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the experience’) 
merely describes the conditions of the language game of perception—it is an 
automatic causal mental state. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective world 
is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual experiences like 
this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer ‘this’ so it should be 
stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to incline me to call it ‘red’”—
as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest of the paragraph is unnecessary 
as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of S1 
and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times these cannot 
intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously activated ‘hinges’ 
that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or most of 
philosophy in the narrow sense) could be titled “The language games describing 
the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient mental states of S1 
with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking of S2” and the 
background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted but it is our 
axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of W’s ‘On 
Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my comments I think 
the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and W’s insights in OC is 
confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of perception where it can at 
best only describe how the language of perception works in various contexts. We 
can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used and that’s the end of it and for the last 
sentence of this section we might say that for something to be a ‘red apple’ is only 
for it to normally result in the same words being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated what 
many (e.g., DMS an eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W expert) 
regard as maybe the greatest discovery in modern philosophy— W’s 
revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do philosophy 
or psychology in the old way anymore without looking antiquated. And though 
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Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole career, in 2009 (i.e., 6 years 
before publication of this book) he spoke at a symposium on it held by the British 
Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly aware of the view that 
has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. I don’t think this meeting 
was published, but his lecture can be downloaded from Vimeo. It seems to be a case 
of an old dog who can’t learn new tricks. Though he has probably pioneered more 
new territory in the descriptive psychology of higher order behavior than anyone 
since Wittgenstein, once he has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all do. 
Like everyone, he uses the French word repertoire when there is an easier to 
pronounce and spell English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse 
sexist ‘she’ when one can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of their higher 
intelligence and education, academics are sheep too. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward 
language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W made 
clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to describe ’primary 
qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary qualities’), which then 
has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows the errors one commits by 
failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge epistemology’ presented in 
“On Certainty”. To show how much clearer this is with the dual system terminology 
I would have to rewrite the whole chapter (and much of the book). Since I have 
rewritten sections here several times, and often in my reviews of Searle’s other 
books, I will only give a couple brief examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. The 
concept of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to produce 
certain sorts of experiences. So the reason that these experiences present red objects 
is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity to produce this sort of 
experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to produce this other sort of 
experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have these experiences without it 
seeming to them that they are seeing a red object or a straight line, and that 
“seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality of the perceptual experience.” 
Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 and the way we use the word ‘red’ 
mandates it’s COS in each context, so using these words in a particular way is what 
it means to see red. In the normal case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we 
just see red and we use ‘seem to” to describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
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On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand that 
there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 due to the 
many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, i.e., percept, 
memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing behavior in algorithms 
(the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of extrapolating from a given neuronal pattern 
in the brain to the multitudinous acts (language games) we use to describe it. The 
‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of S2 used to describe S1. Again, I think his 
failure to use the two systems framework renders this quite confusing if not opaque. 
Of course, he shares this failing with nearly everyone. Searle has commented on this 
before and so have others (e.g., Hacker) but it seems to have escaped most 
philosophers and almost all scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem to 
see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the experience 
and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that constitute the 
innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have the experience 
and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public language with this word 
in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this is a hinge—an axiom of our 
psychology that is our automatic action and is the basis for assumptions or 
judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly be judged, tested or altered. 
As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 is of an entirely different kind than 
one in S2. No explanations are possible—we can only describe how it works and so 
there is no possibility of getting a nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology. As 
he always has, Searle makes the common and fatal mistake of thinking he 
understands behavior (language) better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading 
W, S and many others I find that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’ , aphorisms and 
trialogues usually provide greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions of 
anyone else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything hypothetical 
in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone 
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must take its place.” (PI 109). 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything.” (PI 126) “In philosophy we do not draw conclusions” (PI 599) 
 
“If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would not be possible to debate 
them, because everyone would agree to them” (PI 128) 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a pattern 
of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that we see a red 
rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English speaking 
person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which produces the words ‘I 
see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or simply, S1 produces 
S2 in appropriate contexts. So on p136 we can say S1 leads to S2 which we express 
in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes (but never ‘explains’) how the 
language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context and we can translate “For basic 
actions and basic perceptions the intentional content is internally related to the 
conditions of satisfaction, even though it is characterized non-intentionalistically, 
because being the feature F perceived consists in the ability to cause experiences of 
that type. And in the case of action, experiences of that type consists in their ability 
to cause that sort of bodily movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead 
automatically (internally) to basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to 
withdrawing the arm) which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected 
upon and described in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational (true or 
false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and Myin’s 
book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way to play a language 
game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 for a few hundred msec 
or so and then normally enter S2 where they get language attached (aspectual shape 
or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that S, as part of his lack of attention to the later W, 
never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis of color 
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words in W’s “Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every discussion 
of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game with color 
words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience ‘etc. in this public linguistic context 
(true or false statements—COS2) because there is no language and no meaning in a 
private one (S1). So, it does not matter what happens in the mental states of S1 but 
only what we say about them when they enter S2. It’s clear as day that all 7.6 billion 
on earth have a slightly different pattern of neural activation every time they see 
red and that there is no possibility for a perfect correlation between S1 and S2. As I 
noted above it is absolutely critical for every philosopher and scientist to get this 
clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the normal 
relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. The same 
applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation definitively over 80 
years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can 
one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
It is a sign of Wittgenstein’s unique genius that even though I have spent many 
years reading the best philosophers and psychologists of our times, I always have 
to resist the urge to throw the book down and go back to the master, and when I 
come to a quote from him it is like coming upon a glass of cold water while trudging 
through the desert. 
 
Chapter 6: Yes, disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent and 
the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and even 
among some of his former students who got top marks in his Philosophy of Mind 
classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his Wittgenstein 
studies. Also, we all start with default language use which is full of confusions or 
as W likes to say it is not ‘perspicuous’. 
 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is true-
only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental states 
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which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public language games of 
S2. 
 
On p204 -5 we are reminded that the first and maybe best refutation of mind as 
machine was given by W in the 30’s. Representation is always under an aspect since, 
like thinking, knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, which is 
infinitely variable. 
 
Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the 
discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then one 
should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological mental states, 
and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual shapes) that are 
public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion of unconscious 
mental states is illegitimate since such language games lack any clear sense. 
 
Discussions of blind sight (p209), like those of split brains (commissurotomy) and 
so much else in cognitive science are typically incoherent due to the fact that the 
phenomena are new and the usual language games are not applied in a clear and 
consistent way. Bennett and Hacker, among others, give some excellent discussions 
of this. Sadly, on p211 Searle for maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly 
in his lectures) says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on noted, 
one cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ such as our having choice, nor that 
we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words express the true-only axioms of 
our psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the basis for action. Libet’s 
famous experiments have been debunked in various ways by philosophers and by 
other experiments. 
 
On p214 the reflexes referred to are the formerly deliberative conscious actions of 
S2 which have become automated and part of S1 which I call S2A (automated) as 
distinct from S2D or those which remain deliberative and conscious. 
 
On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On Certainty’ 
who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and that its 
foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is basis of doubt and 
certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted many times that 
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a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public COS and cannot be 
tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads not to further testing but 
to insanity. 
 
P222 section II brings us again to the definitive statement on this foundational issue 
which W addressed in ‘On Certainty’. Searle makes further comments in the 5th of 
his audiotaped lectures on the Philosophy of Society (see youtube). 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent essay 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’. 
There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private experiences as 
‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed us, language can 
only be a public testable activity (no private language). And on p230 the problem is 
not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that (like most if not all 
philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that has no clear COS. As 
W insisted, all we can do is describe—it is the scientists who can make theories. 
P233. The most basic of the primary qualities or axioms of our psychology are time, 
space, event, object etc., which following W, we can call the basic hinges, but it does 
not seem clear how to distinguish these from color, shape, size etc. See the excellent 
recent papers and books of DMS on this. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good 
as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the fundamental insights 
of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two systems of thought 
framework, which could have made it brilliant 
 
